

CURRICULUM VITAE

**James M. Dow**

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Dr. James M. Dow  
Associate Professor of Philosophy  
Hendrix College  
Philosophy  
Neuroscience  
Environmental Studies  
Mills 106  
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**Education**

City University of New York, Graduate Center, Ph. D. in Philosophy, 2011.

University of Massachusetts, Boston, B.A., in Philosophy (with Honors) and  
English (with Honors), 2002.

**Areas of Specialization**

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Action, Environmental Philosophy, Aesthetics

**Areas of Competence**

Neurophilosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science, Moral  
Psychology, Metaphysics and Epistemology, Kant and 19<sup>th</sup> Century

**Dissertation Title**

“Selves and Others: An Interpersonal Account of Self-Consciousness”

Advisor: Jesse Prinz

Committee Members: David Rosenthal, Barbara Montero, Axel Seemann,  
Michael Devitt

**Publications**

Forthcoming 2018 “Environmental Civil Disobedience” Handbook of Philosophy and Public Policy

Forthcoming 2018 “On the Awareness of Joint Agency: A Pessimistic Account of the Feelings of Acting Together” Journal of Social Philosophy

(2017) “Just doing what I do: On the Awareness of Fluent Agency” Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences. March 2017 16: 155–177.

(2014) “Mindreading, Mindsharing, and the Origins of Self-Consciousness” Philosophical Topics. (Backdated to 2012) Vol 40.2: 39–70.

(2012) “On the Joint Engagement of Persons: Self-Awareness, Symmetry and Person Perception” Philosophical Psychology. 25.1: 49–75

### **Comments and Reviews**

(2013) Review Essay of Axel Seemann’s Joint Attention: New Developments in Psychology, Philosophy of Mind, and Social Neuroscience. Humana Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies 24: 245–251.

(2012) “Self-Consciousness and Concepts” Commentary on Stephane Savannah’s “The Concept Possession Hypothesis of Self-Consciousness.” Consciousness and Cognition 12 723–724

(2011) Review of Terry Irwin’s Development of Ethics Ch. 72 “Kant: Meta-Ethical Questions” Philosophical Review

### **In Preparation**

(Book Manuscript) Enactive Nature Aesthetics: Integrating Mind, Action, and Nature

(In Preparation) with Jesse Butler, UCA Philosophy “Subject To Error: Joint Engagement, Contextual Identification, and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification”

(In Preparation) “On the Aesthetic Appreciation of Agricultural Landscapes”

(In Preparation) “On the Possibility of a Neuroaesthetics of Natural Environments”

### **Presentations, Talks, and Commentaries**

(Upcoming) “Appreciating Wildness: Awareness of Agency in Nature Aesthetics” at Carlton University April 6<sup>th</sup>, 2018

- (Upcoming) “On the Aesthetic Appreciation of Agricultural Landscapes” at Midsouth Philosophy Conference March 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2018
- (2018) “On the Possibility of a Neuroaesthetics of Natural Environments” at Lewis and Clark College Philosophy Colloquium Feb 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2018 (Invited)
- (2016) “Interdisciplinary Epistemic Injustice” University of Memphis Philosophy Colloquium November 4<sup>th</sup>, 2016 (Invited)
- (2016) “On the Awareness of Joint Agency: A Pessimistic account of the Feeling of Acting Together” Mississippi State University September 9<sup>th</sup>, 2016 (Invited)
- (2016) “On the Phenomenology of Joint Agency: An Abandonment Account of the Feeling of Acting Together” The Science of Consciousness April 26<sup>th</sup>-30<sup>th</sup> Tucson, Arizona (Referered)
- (2015) “On the Phenomenology of Joint Agency: A Command Abandonment account of the Feeling of Acting Together” Collective Self-Awareness at the University of Vienna, Vienna Austria September 10–12, 2015 (Referreed)
- (2015) “Multi-Level Explanation in Ecology: Reduction, Holism, and Downward Causation” Seizing an Alternative: Toward an Ecological Civilization June 4–7, 2015 (Invited)
- (2015) Commentary on Trip Glazer’s “Language and Expression” at Southern Society for Philosophy and Psychology in New Orleans April 2-4, 2015
- (2014) “Just Doing What I Do: Expert Bodily Action, Self-Consciousness, and the Sense of Agency” at Toward a Science of Consciousness April 2014 Tucson, AZ (Referred talk).
- (2014) “Subject to Error: Is Anarchic Hand Syndrome a Counterexample to Immunity to Error through Misidentification?” at Midsouth Philosophy Conference February 2014 Memphis, TN (Referreed talk).
- (2013) “Perceiving the Value of Agricultural Landscapes” at Beyond Beauty: Perspectives on Environmental Aesthetics at Franklin and Marshall, Lancaster, PA (Invited).
- (2012) “Subject to Error: Is Anarchic Hand Syndrome a Counterexample to Immunity to Error through Misidentification?” at Toward a Science of Consciousness in Tucson, AZ
- (2011) “The Nature of Consciousness” at Hendrix College Steel Center for Philosophy
- (2011) “Historical Solutions to the Problem of Other Minds” at Spring Hill College, Mobile, Alabama (Invited)
- (2010) “Dissolving the Conceptual Problem of Other Minds: Self-Ascription, Symmetry and Person Perception” at Brooklyn College, Dec. 9<sup>th</sup> (Invited)
- (2010) “Subject to Error: Is Anarchic Hand Syndrome a Counterexample to Immunity to Error through Misidentification?” at NYU, Nov. 11 (Invited)
- (2009) “Shoegenstein on Self-Ascription and Immunity to Error” at The Wittgenstein Workshop, at The New School for Social Research, October 29

- (2009) “They are One Person, They are Two Alone: Self-Ascription, Identification and Person Perception” at Joint Attention at Bentley University, October 2 (Refereed)
- (2009) “Against Cognitive Descriptivism: Self-Ascription, Identification and the Subject Principle” at Perception, Action and Consciousness at University of South Alabama, September 26 (Refereed)
- (2009) “They are One Person, They are Two Alone: Self-Ascription, Identification and Person Perception” at The Cognitive Science Symposium, CUNY Graduate Center, September 25
- (2009) “Just Doing What I Do: Expert Action, Reflection and Self-Ascription” at The Varieties of Experience Conference at the University of Glasgow, July 7–8 (Refereed)
- (2009) “Keeping Humpty Dumpty on the Wall: A Critique of Brandom’s Inferential Reliabilism” at The University of Waterloo Graduate Conference on Epistemology, April 30–May 1
- (2008) “Self-Consciousness, Self-Activity and the Agency of the Thinking Subject” at The 3<sup>rd</sup> International Conference on Philosophy, June 2–5, Athens, Greece (Refereed)
- (2007) “Self-Consciousness Ain’t in the Head” at The Cognitive Science Symposium, CUNY Graduate Center, November 9
- (2007) “Self-Consciousness Ain’t in the Head” at Cognition: Embodied, Embedded, Enactive, Extended, University of Central Florida, October 20–24 (Refereed)

**Teaching Experience** (*Full responsibility for all aspects of courses: syllabus development, lecture-discussions, assignments, exams and grading*)

**Associate Professor, Philosophy Department Hendrix College, Conway, AR  
2011–Present**

**2017**

<i>Philosophy of Mind</i>	Fall 2017
<i>Civil Discourse</i>	Fall 2017
<i>The Engaged Citizen: Performing Embodied Resistance</i>	Fall 2017

**2016-2017**

<i>Philosophy of Mind</i>	Fall 2016
<i>What is Beauty?</i>	Fall 2016
<i>Free Will, Agency, and Intentions</i>	Fall 2016

<i>Environmental Aesthetics</i>	Spring 2017
<i>Sanity and Madness</i>	Spring 2017
<i>Neuroscience Senior Seminar</i>	Spring 2017

**2015-2016**

<i>Philosophy of Mind</i>	Fall 2015
<i>Philosophy of Language</i>	Fall 2015
<i>Senior Seminar</i>	Fall 2015
<i>Theory of Knowledge: Epistemic Injustice</i>	Spring 2016
<i>Philosophy of Cognitive Science</i>	Spring 2016
<i>Neurophilosophy</i>	Spring 2016

**2014-2015**

<i>Philosophy of Mind</i>	Fall 2014
<i>Artificial Intelligence</i>	Fall 2014
<i>The Engaged Citizen: Biology, Ethics, and Environment</i>	Fall 2014
<i>Sanity and Madness</i>	Spring 2015
<i>Environmental Philosophy</i>	Spring 2015
<i>The Essay</i>	Spring 2015

**2013-2014**

<i>Philosophy of Mind</i>	Fall 2013
<i>Philosophy of Action</i>	Fall 2013
<i>The Engaged Citizen: The Evolved Person</i>	Fall 2013
<i>Philosophy and Neuroscience</i>	Spring 2014
<i>Philosophy of Agriculture</i>	Spring 2014

**2012-2013**

<i>Introduction to Philosophical Questioning</i>	Fall 2012
<i>Journeys: Freshman Seminar</i>	Fall 2012
<i>Self-Consciousness</i>	Fall 2012
<i>Environmental Philosophy: Permaculture Living</i>	Spring 2013
<i>Epistemology: Objectivity of Perception</i>	Spring 2013
<i>Evolution of the Mind</i>	Spring 2013

**2011-2012**

<i>Metaphysics</i>	Spring 2012
<i>Modern Philosophy</i>	Spring 2012
<i>Philosophy of Psychology (Consciousness)</i>	Spring 2012
<i>Introduction to Philosophical Questioning</i>	Fall 2011

*Philosophy of Mind* Fall 2011  
*Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence* Fall 2011

**Lecturer, Philosophy Department Marist College, Poughkeepsie, NY  
Spring, 2011**

*Ethics* Spring 2011

**Lecturer, Philosophy Department Brooklyn College, NY: 2005–2011**

*Existence, Knowledge and Values* (Freshman Writing Learning Community)

Spring 2005, Fall 2005, Spring 2006, Fall 2006, Spring 2007, Fall 2009, Spring 2010, Fall 2010, Intersession 2011, Spring 2011

*Philosophy of Mind* Spring 2010

*Philosophy of Cognitive Science* Fall 2009

*Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence* Spring 2010 & 2011

*Business Ethics* Fall 2006

**Lecturer, Philosophy Department Drew University, Madison, NJ 2006–2011**

*Introduction to Metaphysics and Epistemology* Fall 2008, Spring 2009

*History of Ancient Philosophy* Fall 2006

*Senior Seminar in Philosophy of Mind—Mind and World: Intentionality* Fall 2007

*Philosophy of Language* Fall 2009

*Problems of Metaphysics* Spring 2010

*Epistemology* Fall 2010

*Senior Seminar in Philosophy of Mind—Selves and Others* Spring 2011

**Writing Fellow, Philosophy Department Brooklyn College, NY: 2007–2009**

Philosophy Writing Resource Book: A Collection of Writing Handouts

Leader of Faculty Workshops:

- “Responding to Student Writing”
- “Writing to Learn: Low-stakes Writing to Engage with Course Content”
- “Designing Writing Assignments”
- “Teaching Avoiding Plagiarism Not Merely Avoiding Punishment”
- “Using Writing to Read Difficult Texts”

**Research Assistant to Michael Devitt and Saul Kripke, Philosophy Dept.  
CUNY Graduate Center, NY: 2003–2004**

**Professional Service**

Journal of Social Ontology, Reviewer  
Philosophical Explorations, Reviewer  
Frontiers in Psychology, Reviewer  
Synthese, Reviewer  
Consciousness and Cognition, Reviewer  
Routledge Philosophy of Mind, Reviewer  
Palgrave New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Reviewer  
Consciousness Online, Reviewer and Commenter, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012  
Metapsychology Online, Reviewer  
Executive Committee, CUNY Graduate Center (2005–2007)  
Member of Hendrix College Committee for Center for Neuroscience and the Study of the Mind

**References**

Jesse Prinz, Distinguished Professor of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center  
Email: [jesse@subcortex.com](mailto:jesse@subcortex.com)  
David Rosenthal, Professor of Philosophy and Coordinator, Interdisciplinary Concentration in Cognitive Science, CUNY Graduate Center  
Email: [davidrosenthal@nyu.edu](mailto:davidrosenthal@nyu.edu)  
Barbara Montero, Professor of Philosophy, CUNY Graduate Center  
Email: [bmontero@gc.cuny.edu](mailto:bmontero@gc.cuny.edu)  
Axel Seemann, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Bentley University  
Email: [aseemann@bentley.edu](mailto:aseemann@bentley.edu)

**Teaching References**

Chris Campolo, Previously Chair of Philosophy, Hendrix College  
Email: [campolo@hendrix.edu](mailto:campolo@hendrix.edu)  
Lawrence Schmidt, Chair of Philosophy, Hendrix College  
Email: [schmidt@hendrix.edu](mailto:schmidt@hendrix.edu)  
Emily Michael, Deputy Chair and Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College  
Email: [emichael@brooklyn.cuny.edu](mailto:emichael@brooklyn.cuny.edu)  
Erik Anderson, Chair and Associate Professor of Philosophy, Drew University

Email: [eanderso@drew.edu](mailto:eanderso@drew.edu)

Matt Moore, Chair and Professor of Philosophy, Brooklyn College

Email: [matthewm@brooklyn.cuny.edu](mailto:matthewm@brooklyn.cuny.edu)

### **Graduate Courses (Audited\*)**

*Psychological Reality of Language*, Michael Devitt

*Philosophy of Mind*, David Rosenthal

*Philosophy of Language*, Saul Kripke and Paul Horwich

*Teaching Philosophy*, Steven Cahn

*Advanced Logic*, Richard Mendelsohn

*Nothing*, Stephen Grover

*Epistemology*, Michael Levin

*Philosophy of Art*, Steven Ross

*Kant's Ethics*, Sibyl Schwarzenbach

*Metaphysics*, Claudine Verheggen

*Systematic Metaphysics*, Doug Lackey

*Ethics*, Stephan Baumrin

*Representing Mental States*, Christopher Peacocke

*Kant*, Arnulf Zweig

*Consciousness, Thought and Language*, David Rosenthal

*Mind and Reality*, Alice Crary and Richard Bernstein

*Self: Metaphysics and Phenomenology*, Galen Strawson

*The Platonic-Aristotelian Conception of the Good*, Claudia Barrachi

*Reference*, Michael Devitt

*Quine and Sellars on Thought and Language*, David Rosenthal

*Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit\**, Doug Lackey

*Kant and Contemporary Philosophy of Mind\**, Beatrice Longuenesse and Christopher Peacocke

*Bodily Awareness\**, Barbara Montero

### **Dissertation Abstract**

My dissertation presents an argument for the claim that awareness of oneself and awareness of others is symmetrical and mutually dependent. On a traditional account of self-consciousness, individuals can be aware of themselves even though they have never been aware of individuals like themselves. First, I provide an analysis of self-consciousness as the self-ascription of experiences that shows that if a subject is to be able to think "I am experiencing F," then he must be able to ascribe experiential predicates, e.g., "b is F," "c is F," to arbitrarily distinguishable individuals. Second, I argue that what follows from this is that in order for one to be self-conscious, one must be able to identify oneself as a subject of experience. However, the traditional account of self-ascription holds that self-ascriptions do not involve identification of a subject, because 'I' is immune to error through misidentification. Contrary to universal opinion, I argue that self-ascriptions are not immune to error through misidentification. Third, I



argue that the identification of the subject of self-ascription is only possible given the perception of oneself as a person among persons, which I call the Persons Theory. The Persons Theory provides us with a genuinely unique account of awareness of other minds that differs from two extant accounts of mental state attribution— the simulation theory and the theory-theory. According to the Persons Theory, rather than imagination or thought, *perception* of persons enables the self-ascription and other-ascription of experiences. I elucidate interactions between subjects in joint perception, action and emotion that are pivotal for self-awareness. An implication of the theory is that awareness of oneself and awareness of others develops in tandem and involves interaction between persons.